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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a model of conflict in an economy characterized by two 
sectors. In a first sector labelled as contested sector two agents struggle in order to 
appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In a second 
sector, the uncontested sector, each agent holds secure property rights over the 
production of some goods. Both agents maximize an income function which can be 
described as a function of contributions of both sectors. Results show that the 
degree of returns in the uncontested sector is a powerful force which countervails 
the impact of destructive and unproductive interaction in the contested sector.   
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Introduction 
 
This note is intended to be a contribution to the theoretical economic analysis of 
conflict. A conflict can be described as « a destructive interaction which involves 
strategic interdependent decisions in the presence of coercion and anarchy ».In 
many general equilibrium models following Hirshleifer (1988),1 a contestable 
output falls into a common pool available for seizure and appropriation. However, 
in reality, agents involved in a conflict have some income and wealth secure from 
appropriation. This should imply that there is a relationship between the choice of 
resources to be allocated to conflict and the choice of resources to be allocate in the 
secure production.   
Take the existence of crime organizations.2 In reality, crime organizations 
do not devote all their efforts and resources to the exploitation and protection of 
‘dirty’ businesses as illegal drugs trafficking, arms smuggling or illegal gambling. 
These businesses require massive collateral investments in ‘military equipment’ in 
order to protect them from state-led policing and other potential criminal 
competitors. In the mean time, crime organizations are also commonly involved in 
many legal activities. This is a common phenomenon in Italian southern regions 
where Sicilian Mafia and Neapolitan Camorra3 are supposed to allocate a huge 
amount of resources in some traditional  sectors as building, construction and real 
estate. 
A very similar phenomenon is also predictable in many developing regions 
where different warlords (or states and rebel groups) fight over the appropriation 
and the control of a territory or resources. On one hand they fight and expend 
                                                 
1 In more recent years several studies extended Hirshleifer’s basic model. See among 
others: Grossman (1991), Grossman and Kim (1995), Skaperdas (1992), Neary (1997), 
Anderton et al. (1999), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), Dixit (2004), Spolaore (2004), 
Caruso (2006a). The literature on the economics of conflict has been recently surveyed and 
deeply expounded in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007). 
2 The interaction between the state and crime organizations has been already analysed as a 
conflict between two groups (Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1995). 
3 Surprisingly, there are few economic studies of italian crime organizations. A first 
empirical evidence is in Marselli and Vannini (1997). See also different theoretical 
contributions in Zamagni (1993).  
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resources to appropriate a contested resource or a fraction of a future income. On 
the other hand, they can be involved in productive activities on the fraction of 
territory whose govern is completely secure. This appears to be the case in 
countries as – for examples among others - Afghanistan, Colombia, Angola or 
Nigeria where some groups hold the power in some regions and continuously send 
(or face) threats of aggression and predation to (from) the recognized state 
government.      
Then, in an extremely simplified economy, it would be possible to consider 
two sectors. In a first sector each agent holds secure property rights over the 
production of some goods. Such secure property rights assure the holder of a secure 
level of production and then of income stream. In the second sector, agents struggle 
in order to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In 
the continuation of this work, I shall label the first sector as uncontested sector and 
to the latter as contested sector. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the type of 
resource allocation in an economy characterized by these two sectors.  
There are some specific features for this economy. First, a world modelled 
as a contested economy involves necessarily strategic behaviour between agents. 
This recalls a point expounded in Bowles and Gintis (1988/1993) who underlined 
the impact of power in market interactions through the expression ‘contested 
exchange’. In fact, the exploitation of coercion through brutal violence is nothing 
but a tool to establish a power relationship shaping the existence and persistence of 
market institutions. The existence of coercion also has a significant impact on the 
overall distribution of resources between productive and unproductive activities      
Then, secondly, the final allocation of resources will depend upon 
exploitation of force. In particular, the relative strength is one of crucial factor in 
determining the final outcome of interaction. Third, there is a productive 
asymmetry between the two sectors. In particular, the economy is modelled as 
having a traditional uncontested sector characterized by decreasing returns to scale 
(DRS) and a contested sector characterized by constant returns to scale (CRS). This 
is a key assumption for this work.  
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To my knowledge, there are very few papers analysing two sectors with 
three activities as two kinds of productive activities (secure production, contested 
production) and unproductive activities. Only Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) 
introduces briefly the argument in a section of their survey on economics of 
conflict, but their model allows only for two types of equilibria. In a first 
equilibrium agents only produce ‘margarine’ thus implying no allocation of 
resources to both ‘butter’ and ‘guns’. In a second kind of equilibrium, both parties 
produce positive quantities of guns and butter but no margarine. Different 
equilibria emerge in the presence of particular combination of a degree of 
decisiveness of the conflict and a production parameter. More attention has been 
paid to economies characterized by two kinds of unproductive activities (defence 
and offence) and productive activities. This  is the case of Grossman and Kim 
(1995), Rider (1999) and Panagariya and Shibata (2000) among others. The latter, 
models an arms rivalry between two small countries facing a constant probability 
of war. Countries produce arms and a consumption good that can be traded 
internationally whilst a defense good interpreted as a public good is non-traded. 
The main result of the article is that a subsidy flowing from one country to another 
can boost consumption and then increase total welfare. Rider (1999) develops a 
model with two goods and three activities (production, predation and defense) to 
show the impossibility of pure and uncontested exchange. In such a framework 
each agent is assumed to produce only one good. However, the first work implying 
a distinction between two types of unproductive activities is Grossman and Kim 
(1995).         
This brief paper is simply designed. In a first section, the model is presented 
and optimal choices at the equilibrium are computed. In a second section, the 
impact of different variables and parameters upon total production and total welfare 
are studied. In a last section, some conclusions and discussions based upon the 
results are presented as well as some insight for future research.   
 
The Model 
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The world is made of two risk-neutral agents indexed by 2,1=i . They interact 
simultaneously. Both agents has a positive resources endowment denoted by 
( ) 2,1,,0 =∞∈ iRi . It can be divided into ‘guns’, ‘butter’ and ‘ice-creams’. By 
‘guns’ I indicate any positive investments in unproductive activities of fighting. By 
‘butter’ I indicate any positive investment in productive activities in the contested 
sector, whilst by ‘ice-creams’ I indicate any positive investments in productive 
activities in the uncontested sector. The interaction between the two agents 
generates an equilibrium allocation of resources endowment among ‘guns’, ‘butter’ 
and ‘ice-creams’. 
To summarise formally it is possible to write the resources constraint as: 
 
2,1, =++= iGxyR iiii        (1) 
 
where iG denotes the level of ‘guns’, and y  and x denote ‘seed’ and ‘butter’ 
respectively. They are all assumed to be positive: ( ) ( ) 2,1,,0,,0 =∞∈∞∈ ixy ii .  
In the contested sector, the contested joint product – indicated by CY - can be 
described as a simple linear additive function: 
 
2211
21
yGyGTR
xxCY
−−−−=
=+=
       (2) 
 
where 21 RRTR += . This aggregate production function is characterized by 
constant returns to scale and constant elasticity of substitution. The outcome of the 
struggle is determined by means of an ordinary Contest success function4 
(henceforth CFS for brevity) in its ratio form: 
 
( ) 2,1,,
21
21 =+= iGG
GGGp ii        (3)   
                                                 
4Selective seminal contributions on CSF are by Tullock (1980), O’Keeffe et al. (1984), 
Rosen (1986) and Dixit (1987). See then Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) for a 
basic axiomatization. See also Amegashie (2006) and Peng (2006). 
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The functional form adopted for CSF implies that the conflict is not decisive, 
namely it could be said that it exhibits constant returns to fighting. Equation (3) is 
differentiable and follows the conditions below: 
 
 



>∂∂
<∂∂
<∂∂
>∂∂
==
=+
0/
0/
0/
0/
at  5.
1
22
21
21
ji
ji
ii
ii
i
Gp
Gp
Gp
Gp
GGp
pp
      (3.1) 
 
and then the outcome in the contested sector is given by: 
 
( ) CYGGpS ii θ21 ,=         (4)   
 
Where ( )1,0∈θ denotes a physical destruction parameter. It can be interpreted as an 
ex-ante perception of destructiveness of conflict. That is, a conflict is twice costly. 
On one hand the amount resources allocated to ‘guns’ do constitute a deadweight 
loss for society because the same amount of resources could be allocated to more 
productive activities. On the other hand, in the case of actual violent conflicts there 
is a fraction of resources physically destroyed. Take the gravest case of a war and 
consider for simplicity a potential labour supply. All the potential labourers could 
become either soldiers or farmers. On one hand all the men involved in soldiering 
do constitute a deadweight loss because they could be employed as farmers. On the 
other hand, if an actual war breaks out many of them will be killed. The ex-ante 
perception on the percentage of killed soldiers (that is the fraction of human 
capital) do constitute an example of θ . At this stage, given the sharp analytical 
complexity I shall assume for sake of simplicity that it is equal for both agents. As 
θ  increases, the conflict is perceived less and less destructive. Given conditions 
(3.1) the fraction of contestable output accruing to agent i  is increasing in its own 
level of guns whereas it is decreasing in the  opponent’s level of guns. Equation (4) 
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is the cornerstone of the classical Hirshleifer’s model of continuing conflict 
featuring two risk-neutral agents.    
The uncontested sector is modelled as a traditional sector exhibiting 
decreasing returns to scale. Therefore, the production function is a standard 
intensive production function which exhibits decreasing returns to scale: 
 
( ) ( ) ba yyYyyY 222111 ; ==        (5) 
 
where iy  denotes the level of resources devoted to the uncontested production by 
agent i  and ( )1,0∈a  and ( )1,0∈b  are the parameters capturing the degree of 
returns of scale for agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. Trivial to say that  ( ) 00 =Y , 
( ) ∞=∞Y , 0/ >∂∂ yY , 0/ 22 <∂∂ iyY , 10/,10/ 2211 >⇔>∂∂>⇔>∂∂ ybYyaY . 
The level of production in the uncontested sector can be simply denoted through 
21 YYUY += .  
Therefore, the final income of each agent can be described as a function of 
contributions of both sector as ( )iii SYfW ,= . Eventually each agent maximizes an 
objective function as:  
 
( ) 2,1,, =+= iSYSYW iiiii        (6) 
 
This kind of function can lead to ambiguous results. On one hand, an increase in 
the amount of ‘guns’ lower the level of production. On the other hand, final wealth 
of each agent could be raised through positive investments in appropriative 
activities. Agents are assumed to be rational and to interact simultaneously à la 
Nash-Cournot. Under an ordinary process of maximization the optimal choices5 of 
‘ice-creams’ are: 
 
                                                 
5 Studying the second order condintions it is possibile to show that the critical points ( )*2*1*2*1 ,,, yyGG  do require a sufficiently high level of TR to be an equilibrium.  
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)1/(1
*
1
2 aay
−


= θ   (7.1) 
)1/(1
*
2
2 bby
−


= θ   (7.2) 
 
The optimal level of ‘ice-creams’ is unambiguously larger than zero 
( 2,1,0* => iyi ) for both agents and it is increasing in the degree of returns to scale, 
0/,0/ *2
*
1 >∂∂>∂∂ byay . Note also that the level of ‘ice-creams’ is decreasing in the 
degree of destructiveness 0/* <∂∂ θiy .  The optimal level of ‘guns’ is given by: 
 
)1/(1
)1/()12(
)1/(1
)1/()12(**
2
*
1 224
b
bb
a
aa baTRGGG
−
−−
−
−− 

−

−=== θθ   (8) 
 
The level of ‘guns’ is larger than zero if and only if *2
*
1 yyTR −−> . Given (7.1) and 
(7.2) the latter condition always hold. Note that the optimal level of guns is 
increasing in the degree of destructiveness, 0/* >∂∂ θG . Namely, the higher is the 
perceived potential destruction the higher is the willingness to avoid it by a massive 
investments in arms. Moreover it is clear that 
0/,0/,0/,0/ *2
*
2
*
1
*
1 <∂∂<∂∂<∂∂<∂∂ bGGbGaG α . It is possible to compute the 
optimal level of ‘butter’ simply as: 
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−
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−
−− 

+


 

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  (9.2) 
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And it is possible to show that the level of butter of each agent is decreasing in its 
degree of returns to scale and increasing in rival’s degree of return to scale, namely  
0/1 <∂∂ ax , 0/1 >∂∂ bx , 0/2 <∂∂ bx , 0/2 >∂∂ ax .  This means that as the degree 
of returns to scale increases each agent will prefer to allocate resources to the 
uncontested sector. That is, as the secure and uncontested sector becomes more 
productive (albeit still in the range of the DRS) the level of contested ‘butter’ 
decreases.   
Of course, the optimal level of butter of agent i  is increasing in its own 
initial endowment and decreasing in the endowment of the opponent, namely 
jiiRxRx jiii ≠=<∂∂>∂∂ ,2,1,0/,0/ . Final incomes of both agents are then given 
by: 
 
( ) )1/()1/(1)1/()12()1/()1/()12(*1 2224 −−−−
−
−− −

−+= bbbbb
aa
aa baaTRW θθ
θ    (10.1) 
( ) )1/()1/(1)1/()12()1/()1/()12(*2 2224 −−−−
−
−− −

−+= aaaaa
bb
bb abbTRW θθ
θ    (10.2)  
 
Final incomes are positive if and only some conditions are satisfied 
)1/(1
*
1 20
bbTRW
−


>⇔> θ  
whereas  
 
( ) )1/(1*2 2/0 −>⇔> aTRW θ . 
 
Eventually,  note that incomes of both agents are decreasing in both degrees of 
returns to scale under some conditions. Verify that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 01/2ln20/,01/2ln20/ *2*1 >−+−⇔<∂∂>−+−⇔<∂∂ bbbbWaaaaW θθ
,  and 0/,0/ *2
*
1 <∂∂<∂∂ aWbW .  
Then, there is a combination of a  and θ  that makes the income of each agent 
decreasing in its own degree of returns to scale. In particular, the first condition 
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states that as 1→θ (namely, the conflict is perceived less and less destructive)  
there are positive values for a  allowing for a negative impact of the degree of 
returns upon the level of income. For example if 75.=θ , then 
24.00/*1 <<⇔<∂∂ aaW . The intuition behind appears to be simple. In other 
words, when agent 1 does not retain a high degree of returns in the uncontested 
sector and interprets the conflict as non-destructive, it will have less incentives to 
invest in the secure and uncontested sector.   
  To sum up it is possible to write the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: when agents are identical in their fighting abilities and asymmetric 
in their degrees of returns to scale in the uncontested sector a combination of the 
destruction parameter and the degree of returns affect the optimal allocation of 
resources. In particular it is clear that: (a) as the degree of returns to scale 
increases each agent will prefer to allocate more resources to the uncontested 
sector; (b)when the conflict is perceived to be non-destructive each agent has less 
incentives to invest in the uncontested sector.   
 
Production and Welfare 
As tools for ‘measurement’ I analyse hereafter the level of production and the total 
welfare. I shall consider  the impact of the different variables and parameters on 
them. First, Using (5), (7.1) and (7.2) it is possible to compute the level of 
production emerging in the uncontested sector. Then we have: 
 
)1/()1/(
22
bbaa baUY
−−


+

= θθ        (11) 
 
First, the level of uncontested production is unambiguously larger than zero. 
Eventually it is worth noting that ( ) 01/2ln0/ >+−⇔>∂∂ aaaUY θ  and 
( ) 01/2ln0/ >+−⇔>∂∂ bbbUY θ . That is, as the conflict is perceived to be less 
and less destructive the degree of returns in the uncontested sector must be 
sufficiently high. Otherwise, in the presence of low returns to scale both agents 
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would be better off by allocating resources into the contested sector. In such a case, 
the level of production in the uncontested sector would decrease. In other words, 
when the returns in the uncontested sector are extremely low the level of 
uncontested production would decrease. For instance, set arbitrary 75.=θ , in order 
to have a level of UY increasing in a and b it is necessary to have 16., >ba . By 
contrast, as 0→θ  a very low degree of returns would even suffice to satisfy the 
positive relationship between total production in the uncontested sector and degree 
of returns.  
Using (9.1) and (9.2) the level of production in the contested sector – 
namely the contested output -  is given by: 
 
)1/(1
)1/(
)1/(1
)1/(*
2
*
1 222
b
bb
a
aa baTRxxCY
−
−
−
− 

−

−=+= θθ     (12) 
 
It is trivial to say that CY is increasing in the level of resources 0/ >∂∂ TRCY  and 
decreasing in the destruction parameter 0/ <∂∂ θCY . At the same time it is 
unambiguously decreasing in both a  and b , 0/,0/ <∂∂<∂∂ bCYaCY . The higher 
are the returns in the uncontested sector the lower would be the level of production 
in the contested sector. It is worth noting that there are combinations of a  and b , 
both being between zero and unity, that allows for UYCY = . The plot below 
reports the curves denoting the locus UYCY = for 200=TR  and three different 
values for θ . As it is simply shown as the conflict becomes less destructive the 
combination of a  and b allowing for UYCY = requires higher values for both a  
and b . All the points above the curves allow for CYUY > . Then, to have the 
desirable scenario of CYUY >  both a  and b  must be sufficiently high. This is 
depicted in Figure 1.  
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FIGURE 1 – UNCONTESTED AND CONTESTED PRODUCTION  
 
 
The total production in the economy is simply given by the sum of (9.1) and (9.2) 
 
( ) ( ) )1/()1/(1)1/()1/(1 22
2
bbbaaa bbaaTR
UYCYTY
−−−− −+−+=
=+=
θθθθ    (13) 
 
Also in this case it is clear that 0/,0/ >∂∂<∂∂ TRTYTY θ . Given the results 
presented above it appears to be predictable that the degree of returns can have an 
ambiguous impact on the level of total production. In particular the partial 
derivatives with respect to a  and b show that the total production is largely 
decreasing  in the degrees of returns to scale. More formally, we have: 
  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 011/2ln0/ >−−+−⇔<∂∂ θθθ aaaaTY     (13.a) 
 
and  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 011/2ln0/ >−−+−⇔<∂∂ θθθ bbbbTY .    (13.b) 
 
In fact, when the conflict is perceived to be destructive both agents allocate more 
resources in the uncontested sector. This can decrease the level of production in the 
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contested sector. Then, although it can appear paradoxical, this can also decrease 
the level of total production. This would depend upon specific combinations of ba,  
and θ .  
It is possible to compute the total welfare as the sum of incomes. Then : 
 
( ) ( ) )1/()1/(
*
2
*
1
2121
2
bbaa bbaaTR
WWTW
−−


−+

−+=
=+=
θθθ
    (14) 
 
The level of total welfare is increasing in the level of resources 0/ >∂∂ TRTW . 
Note also that ( ) 0/2ln0/ >⇔>∂∂ θaaTW  and ( ) 0/2ln0/ >⇔>∂∂ θbbTW . 
Therefore, as the conflict becomes less destructive the degree of returns in the 
uncontested sector must be sufficiently high. The level of total welfare is 
decreasing in θ  if and only if the following condition is satisfied: 
 
( )( )( ) ( ) 0222 )1/(1)1/(1)1/(1)1/(1)1/(1 <−− −−−−− baabb babTR θθ     (15) 
 
which after some manipulations can be reduced to: 
 
( ) 02 )1/(1)1/(1 <− −− bbbTR θ        (16) 
 
Setting  an arbitrary value for TR  it is possible to plot a parameter space ( )θ,b . All 
the points below the curves represent all the combinations of b and θ  that satisfy 
condition (16).  
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FIGURE 2 – WHEN TOTAL WELFARE IS DECREASING IN θ  
 
 
The plot simply shows that when the degree of returns to scale for agent 2 is 
sufficiently high total welfare is decreasing in the destruction parameter even if the 
latter is very close to unity (namely when the conflict appears to be almost non-
destructive). However, by contrast, it is clear that when the total resources 
endowment is sufficiently high, the level of total welfare is increasing in the 
destruction parameter.  
 The latter result states that in the presence of one agent sufficiently 
productive in the uncontested sector production total welfare is no longer 
increasing in θ  . Put differently, even if the conflict is perceived to be non-
destructive investing in the contested sector does not increase total welfare. This 
confirms the idea that the existence of conflict does not constitute a socially 
optimal incentive scheme. This is particularly relevant when considering that the 
contested sector has been assumed to be characterized by constant returns to scale, 
whilst the uncontested sector has been assumed to exhibit decreasing returns to 
scale. That is, even if the contested sector seems to ensure higher returns  
To sum up it is possible to write: 
 
PROPOSITION 2: when agents are identical in their fighting abilities and asymmetric 
in their degrees of returns to scale in the uncontested sector then (a) when the 
returns in the uncontested sector are extremely low the level of uncontested 
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production decreases. Put differently, as the conflict is perceived to be less and less 
destructive the degree of returns in the uncontested sector must be sufficiently 
high; (b) The higher are the returns in the uncontested sector the lower would be 
the level of production in the contested sector; (c) there are combinations of the 
degrees of returns in the uncontested sector that equals the level of production in 
the two sectors; (d) even if the conflict is perceived to be non-destructive and the 
contested sector exhibits constant returns to scale,  investing in the contested sector 
does not increase total welfare. In the presence of one agent sufficiently productive 
in the uncontested sector production total welfare is not increasing in the 
destruction parameter.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of this paper highlights the interaction between two risk-neutral agents 
that can allocate their own resources both into a contested sector and an 
uncontested sector. The main results I would claim for this preliminary work is that 
even if the conflict is perceived to be non-destructive and the contested sector 
exhibits constant returns to scale  investing in the contested sector does not increase 
total welfare.  That is, although the contested sector appears to be guarantee higher 
returns than the uncontested sector, total welfare is no longer increasing in the 
destruction parameter.  
This suggests that the level of productivity in the uncontested sector can be 
a powerful factor inducing a higher allocation of resources in ordinary 
entrepreneurial activity. This recalls the famous discussion posed by Baumol 
(1990) that suggested how entrepreneurs allocate their resources depending on the 
relative returns of productive and unproductive activities. According the model of 
this work, a major positive investment in the uncontested sector would follow a  
superior productivity in the contested sector. This would move resources in the 
uncontested and also lower socially investments in unproductive ‘guns’. However, 
there could be many other factors affecting this process. Tornell and Lane (1999) 
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for example, analysing an economy with an efficient formal sector and a less 
efficient informal sector state that a productivity improvement in the efficient 
sector does not lead to an increase in welfare when there are powerful groups 
demanding for discretionary redistribution. By contrast, when groups are powerless 
or when there recognized barriers to redistribution a productivity improvement can 
raise welfare.  
Moreover, a further point to be investigated is related to the measurement 
and evaluation of resulting equilibria. Recall that, since also the investments in 
‘butter’ do constitute investments in productive activities, it is possible to have 
resulting equilibria which cannot be ranked by pareto criterion. Therefore, 
allocation of resources to ‘butter’ do also improve both total production and total 
welfare. Under a different protocol of interaction a negotiated settlement could 
move a huge amount of resources into the contested sector, namely in ‘butter’. In 
such a case, a decrease in the investments in ‘ice-creams’ may not be necessarily 
detrimental for welfare. Or at least, this kind of result should not be excluded from 
the beginning.   
In terms of economic and public policies the results of the paper suggest 
that deterrence does not appear to be the only viable way to eradicate violent 
struggles for predation and appropriation. Higher returns in the uncontested sector 
would lower the level of ‘guns’ in the society as it is clear when analysing equation 
(8). In this respect, the model presented is nothing but an exciting first step. The 
model would be enriched when considering some specific policy measures as for 
example taxation, redistribution and public funded transfers. In particular, the tax 
burden imposed upon a fraction of population by a ruling elite has been interpreted 
as a crucial factor moving the this is the basic idea surrounding  some brilliant 
works as Grossman (1991) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). In the first, the 
author shows that a too high tax rate imposed by the ruler would increase the 
probability of a successful insurrection. Albeit with a different technical approach 
and with no distinction between ‘butter’ and ‘guns’, in the latter,  the authors – 
under different scenarios - interpret the tax rate as instrument of redistributive 
policies used by the governing elite in favour of the citizens so determining a 
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revolution constraint. In fact, fearing a revolution the elite can make concessions 
and set a tax rate that redistribute some of the resources to the citizen. In such a  
framework, the revolution constraint is strongly affected by existing income 
inequality which can be modified through redistributive policies. 
Eventually, this paper can be enriched while considering exactly a market 
interaction involving the goods produced in the uncontested sectors. In this model, 
the interaction is intrinsically only conflictual. At this point, there is no clear 
modelling of actual exchange interaction between  agents.  
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